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BLOCKCHAIN HAVENS AND THE NEED FOR THEIR 
INTERNATIONALLY-COORDINATED REGULATION  
Omri Marian 
Forthcoming, 20 N.C. J. of L. & Tech. (2019) 
This paper describes the rise of a new form of regulatory havens. 
Jurisdictions that have traditionally been characterized as “tax havens” are 
gradually becoming hubs for blockchain-based ventures. These jurisdictions 
attract blockchain entrepreneurs by offering refuge from regulatory and tax 
burdens imposed by developed economies. These new “Blockchain Havens” 
create a regulatory “race to the bottom” that is traditionally associated with 
the world of international tax evasion and avoidance. 
Over the past several years, developed economies have put to use—
mostly through coordinated efforts—several regulatory frameworks aimed to 
address some of the negative effects of tax havens. These regulatory 
instruments are aimed against the haven jurisdictions themselves, or the 
private institutions operating in such jurisdictions. However, this paper 
argues that the unique nature of blockchain-based technology – most 
importantly, decentralization and temper resistance – makes such traditional 
anti tax haven policies ineffective in the blockchain context.       
This paper argues that coordinated international regulatory policies 
must be quickly developed to address certain important aspects of blockchain 
technology. Such coordination is necessary to prevent an uncontrolled 
regulatory race to the bottom, while at the same time preserving the benefits 
of blockchain-based applications. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Over the past few years, several countries have been engaged in a race to 
become leading hubs for blockchain technology.1 For example, Switzerland 
recently launched a government-backed consortium intended to support “the 
development of Blockchain and cryptographic related technologies and 
businesses.”2 The Cayman Islands has created a dedicated economic zone—
the Cayman Enterprise City—that caters, among others, to blockchain 
entrepreneurs.3 The Maltese government adopted policies aiming to make 
Malta “one of the world’s friendliest jurisdictions”4 for cryptocurrencies, and 
in February of 2018, the Marshall Islands became the first nation to launch a 
sovereign cryptocurrency.5  
If you find something in common among the jurisdictions mentioned, you 
are not mistaken. Many of the countries making significant strides in this 
quickly-developing sector of the economy6 are well-known centers of 
offshore financing, where bank secrecy and tax relief are essential 
commodities.7 They are popularly known as “tax havens.” Tax haven 
jurisdictions are not the only ones engaged in an attempt to recruit blockchain 
companies, but they seem to be significantly outweighing their size in the 
world economy in this context.8 
It is a familiar experience. These offshore financial centers try to appeal 
to blockchain entrepreneurs mostly by offering secrecy, light-touch 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Nathaniel Popper, Have a Cryptocurrency Company? Bermuda, Malta or 
Gibraltar Wants You, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/29/technology/cryptocurrency-bermuda-malta-
gibraltar.html; Don Tapscott, Who will Win the Worldcup of Blockchain?, QUARTZ (June 27, 
2018), https://qz.com/1315302/who-would-win-the-world-cup-of-blockchain/. 
2 William Suberg, Switzerland Launches Crypto Valley Association Backed by 
Government, COINTELEGRAPH (Mar. 1, 2017), https://cointelegraph.com/news/switzerland-
launches-crypto-valley-association-backed-by-government. 
3 Ken Silva, Cayman Courting Blockchain Companies, CAYMAN COMPASS (Jan. 30, 
2018), https://www.caymancompass.com/2018/01/30/cayman-courting-blockchain-
companies/. 
4 Viren Vghela & Andrea Tan, How Malta Became a Hub of the Cryptocurrency World, 
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-04-23/how-
malta-became-a-hub-of-the-cryptocurrency-world-quicktake.  
5 Declaration and Issuance of the Sovereign Currency Act Bill 2018, Nitijela Bill 
125ND2 pt. 3 (RMI). 
6 See PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW: THE RULE 
OF CODE 3 (2018) (“In just a few years the reach of blockchain has rapidly extended beyond 
payment and financial products, helping to support new autonomous systems that structure 
social and economic interactions with less of a need for intermediaries.”). 
7 Eric Czuleger, The Tiny Nations Plotting to Become Tax Havens for Cryptocurrencies, 
OZY (Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.ozy.com/fast-forward/the-tiny-nations-plotting-to-
become-tax-havens-for-cryptocurrencies/88846. 
8 See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
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regulation, and minimal taxation.9 The haven jurisdictions thus reap the 
benefits of incorporation10. Some commentators therefore refer to these 
jurisdictions as “Cryptocurrency Havens,”11 or “Blockchain Havens.”12 In 
this paper I opt for the term “Blockchain Havens”, as such terminology 
encompasses all potential applications of blockchain technology. The term 
“Cryptocurrency Havens”, on the other hand, suggests a narrow focus of the 
use of crypto-tokens as currencies.    
This paper describes the rise of tax haven jurisdictions as leaders in 
blockchain technology development, and their manifestation as so-called 
Blockchain Havens. The paper also explores the normative and practical 
ramifications of this phenomenon. 
The paper posits that one of the main reasons for this phenomenon is the 
increasingly successful battle of developed economies against tax havens’ 
traditional role as facilitators of tax avoidance and evasion.13 In recent years, 
developed economies have instituted multitude of laws, and engaged in 
multiple international initiatives to undo the perceived damages caused by 
tax havens.14 For example, in 2010, the United States adopted the Foreign 
Accounts Tax Compliance Act (“FATCA”),15 forcing certain financial 
institutions to deliver information about their account holders to the IRS, or 
face debilitating financial consequences in the United Sates.16 The FACTA 
framework was adopted by the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) to develop the “Common Reporting Standards” 
(CRS),17 which include an international standard for automatic exchange of 
taxpayer information between governments. As of the drafting of this article, 
over 100 jurisdictions have adopted instruments committing to exchange 
                                                 
9 See Ronen Palan, Tax Havens and the Commercialization of State Sovereignty, 56 
INT’L ORG. 151 (2002) (describing tax havens’ business model of sovereignty 
commercialization). 
10 Such as incorporation fees and passive investment associated with it. 
11 Darryn Pollock, Which Countries are Best to Start Blockchain Projects, 
COINTELEGRAPH (Aug. 9, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/which-countries-are-best-
to-start-blockchain-projects. 
12 Yoav Vilner, Bill Clinton Speaks at 'Swell by Ripple' as Regulatory Concerns Grow, 
FORBES (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/yoavvilner/2018/10/03/bill-clinton-
speaks-at-swell-by-ripple-as-regulatory-concerns-grow/#6e06584e22fc. 
13 For a summary of recent coordinated efforts to battle offshore tax havens, see Itai 
Grinberg, The New International Tax Diplomacy, 104 GEO. L.J. 1137 (2016); Itai 
Grinberg, The Battle Over Taxing Offshore Accounts, 60 UCLA L. REV. 304 (2012). 
14 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
15 Foreign Accounts Tax Compliance Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1471–74 (2012). 
16 Generally, under FATCA, a foreign financial institution (FFI) must agree to deliver 
certain information to the IRS on the FFI’s U.S. account holders, or face a 30% gross tax on 
the FFI’s U.S. earnings.   
17 OECD, STANDARD FOR AUTOMATIC EXCHANGE OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNT 
INFORMATION IN TAX MATTERS (2nd ed. 2017). 
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information based on the CRS system.18 The European Union has also 
adopted several measures over the past several years to facilitate automatic 
exchange of taxpayer information between member states.19 These 
international and national actions undermine the main value the tax havens 
offer to tax evaders: no taxes and financial secrecy.   
It is meaningful that these anti tax haven actions are not targeting--at list 
not directly--tax evaders or avoiders themselves. Rather, these measures 
target intermediaries that are in a position to collect information about tax 
evaders: tax havens’ governments, and tax havens’ financial institutions. In 
this environment, the rise of the blockchain technology is like a godsend for 
tax cheats and for tax havens. Blockchain, in its very essence, is a 
decentralized ledger that documents ownership and transfers, but does not 
require transacting parties to identify themselves to one another.20 Secrecy is 
back in play, but this time with no need for intermediaries.    
The blockchain financial ecosystem may thus offer similar advantages to 
the ones traditionally offered by tax havens.21 First, it allows for the parties 
to financial transfers to remain rather anonymous, though not completely.22 
Second, since Blockchain technology operates in a decentralized manner, 
there is no centralized government or other institution that may impose tax. 
However, blockchain cannot simply replace tax havens. Any application, 
even if it is decentralized, needs to start somehow, somewhere, by someone. 
There needs to be an initial entrepreneur, some sort of initial infrastructure 
(computers, servers, programmers), and most importantly, there is a need to 
raise initial capital. Even if blockchain itself is “immune” from regulation, 
the creation of a blockchain venture and the process of fundraising may 
themselves be regulated. This is where blockchain havens come into this new 
financial ecosystem. 
Instead of offering regulatory refuge themselves (because they no longer 
can), traditional havens offer regulatory refuge to blockchain companies. 
Stated differently, the new havens offer regulatory refuge to the technology 
                                                 
18 CRS MULTILATERAL COMPETENT AUTHORITY AGREEMENT (2018) [hereinafter 
MCAA].  
19 EUROPEAN COMM'N, TAXATION AND CUSTOMS UNION, THE ANTI TAX AVOIDANCE 
DIRECTIVE (2016), https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/company-tax/anti-tax-
avoidance-package/anti-tax-avoidance-directive_en. 
20 For a discussion on the anonymity provided by blockchain ledgers, see FILIPPI & 
WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW, supra note 6, at 43–45. 
21 Omri Marian, Are Cryptocurrencies Super Tax Havens?, 112 MICH. L. REV. FIRST 
IMPRESSIONS 38, 39 (2013) (“Cryptocurrencies possess the traditional characteristics of tax 
havens: earnings are not subject to taxation and taxpayers’ anonymity is maintained.”).  
22 Omri Marian, A Conceptual Framework for the Regulation of Cryptocurrencies, 82 
U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 53, 57 (2015) (“It should be noted, however, that most 
cryptocurrencies are not completely anonymous, but rather are pseudonymous.”).  
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that offers regulatory refuge. In a sense, Cryptocurrency Havens are “meta 
tax-havens” or “meta offshore financial centers.” As developed economies 
act against haven governments, it seems that haven jurisdictions are 
responding by becoming hosts to technologies that offer traditional haven-
like benefits. 
One might ask, is this necessarily a bad thing? The answer is absolutely 
not. Blockchain technology offer many potential benefits.23 However, it also 
possesses unique risks. Most importantly for this paper, is the fact that 
blockchain transactions cannot be reversed, and can serve as a platform for 
automated execution.24 Thus, when haven governments offer very light 
regulatory touch, they may attract bad actors who may utilize the regulatory 
leniency to misuse blockchain technology. In such a case, even if the illicit 
act is identified, there is little that can be done. The bad actor can get the illicit 
gain and disappear thanks to anonymity feature embedded in the technology, 
and the victim has no recourse given the permanent nature of blockchain 
transactions. 
Consider for example a fraudulent transfer of funds facilitated by a haven-
based blockchain technology. If the victim is a U.S. citizen, for example, she 
has no recourse. There is no way to undo the transaction. And, because of the 
decentralized nature of blockchain there is no intermediary involved, which 
may otherwise provide relief, for example, through insurance proceeds. There 
is nothing the haven government can do, even if it wanted to, because it 
cannot “undo” the transaction. Punishing or regulating haven government or 
financial institutions is thus futile.  
If such problems became prevalent, developed economies may have no 
choice but to respond with a heavy hand. If the blockchain-based transaction 
cannot be undone, the only way to address bad actors is to prevent the 
transaction for taking place in the first place. Since the system is 
decentralized, there is no one actor a developed government can regulate. It 
can only go after the blockchain infrastructure, for example, by shutting down 
internet traffic into the country from servers associated with certain with 
problematic activity. Such action may prove over-inclusive, and result in the 
loss of the many positive attributes of blockchain technology. In order to 
prevent such bleak future, this paper offers a cooperative international 
framework for a cross-border blockchain regulation that would discourage 
illicit use of blockchain and allow some form of recourse to victims of bad 
actors, regardless of the victim’s location and identity. 
This paper continues as follows: Part I outlines the nature of blockchain 
as an autonomous regulatory haven. Part II explain the demise of the 
traditional tax haven business model. Part III explains the rise of Blockchain 
                                                 
23 See infra note 28 and accompanying text.  
24 See discussion infra Part V. 
Draft of Mar. 17, 2019
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3357168
6 Blockchain Havens  
Havens. Part IV considers the ramifications of Blockchain Havens in the 
absence of a regulatory framework. That part identifies the unique properties 
of blockchain technology that make Blockchain Havens problematic. Part V 
offers some ideas for a cooperative international framework to regulate 
blockchain based applications.                               
I. II.  BLOCKCHAIN AS AN AUTONOMOUS REGULATORY 
ENVIRONMENT 
A. Blockchain and Private Regulation  
In its essence, blockchain is a decentralized ledger that records ownership 
and value transfers.25 As such, Blockchain provides a platform for 
autonomously-executed applications. For example, users can program a 
contractual arrangement onto the blockchain, coding-in triggering event to 
upon which contractual provisions are executed.26 Since the contractual 
execution is decentralized, neither of the parties to the contract can prevent 
execution if a triggering event occurs. 
For example, blockchain-based applications can assure that inheritance 
funds are transferred to an heir only upon her reaching the age of 21. Unless 
otherwise coded, upon her reaching to 21 year of age she will receive the 
funds and no one person will be able to prevent the transfer. Partnership 
profits can be automatically distributed to partners once certain profitability 
targets are met. The ignition of a car can be programed to work once a 
complete transfer of funds from the car buyer’s bank account to the seller’s 
account. Blockchain technology thus creates “order without law and 
implement what can be thought of as private regulatory framework.”27 Rules 
can be privately-created, and automatically executed. In theory, these is no 
need for state (or private intermediary) intervention.  
Countries have been struggling with how to regulate this new platform, 
as it holds both promises and significant risks28. Autonomous 
decentralization can eliminate costly intermediaries from contractual process, 
reducing transaction costs. The system is almost tamper-proof, because no 
one person controls the process. For the same reason, blockchain 
technologies significantly limit the ability of bad actors to restrict the flow of 
information. 
On the other hand, governments lose much of their ability to regulate 
processes, or prevent undesired outcomes. This may enable illicit activity—
                                                 
25  For an explanation of the operation of blockchain technology, see FILIPPI & WRIGHT, 
supra note 6, at 13–57.  
26 Id. at 43–45. 
27 Id. at 5. 
28 For a discussion of the dual nature of blockchain, as a force of both good and evil, see 
id. at 45–46.  
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such as money laundering, transfers that violate IP rights, or illicit 
contracts—to operate undetected. Even if detected, it is not clear what 
governments can do about it, because a decentralized process cannot just be 
“stopped.” Indeed, there is evidence that cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin—
the most well-known application of blockchain—are favorite among illicit 
actors.29  
Different jurisdictions have responded with widely varied regulatory 
approaches to blockchain. A recent global survey by the international law 
firm Pinsent Masons documents five different categories of regulatory 
response, from complete regulatory obliviousness on the one end, to an 
outright ban on blockchain-based ventures on the other.30 In the next subpart, 
I use the global Initial Coin Offerings (“ICO”) market to demonstrate the 
confused regulatory response.   
B. The ICO Market as a Case Study 
ICOs are blockchain-based crowdfunding platforms. In an ICO, a 
promoter issues a blockchain-based digital token in exchange for value. The 
token “imbue[s] holders with certain rights, privileges, or rewards within the 
context of particular online application or service.”31 In theory, since the 
privileges are blockchain-based, the rights of token-holder are automatically 
preserved. This can be a powerful governance instrument.  
There are multiple types of ICOs and tokens.32 For example, “utility 
tokens” may allow holders access to a future product or service funded by the 
ICO. 33 “Equity tokens” are similar to traditional equity, and may allow token 
holders the right to vote on matters funded by the ICO, or share in the profits 
of the ICO-funded venture.34 Moreover, depending on the terms of the ICO, 
token holders may (or may not) transfer their tokens exchange for valuable 
considerations in a secondary market. “Currency tokens” are probably the 
most well-known application of blockchain technology, and are simply used 
as a medium of exchange.35    
Over the past several years the ICO market has gradually increased in 
significance. One study estimated that in 2017 alone, 413 ICOs raised more 
                                                 
29 For a discussion of illicit demand for blockchain, see Shanaan Cohsey, Coin-
Operated Capitalism, COLUM. L. REV. 65–67 (forthcoming, 2019). 
30 BITCOIN, BLOCKCHAIN AND INITIAL COIN OFFERINGS: A GLOBAL REVIEW (Pinset 
Masons, 2017). 
31 FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 100. 
32 For a description of different types of tokens, see Dirk Zetzsche et. al., The ICO Gold 
Rush: It’s a Scam, it’s a Bubble, it’s a Super Challenge for Regulators, 18 EUROPEAN BANK 
INST. WORKING PAPER 7 (2018).  
33 Id.  
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
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than $10 billion USD.36 In 2018, 1012 ICO were successful in raising funds 
to the tune of $11.6 billion USD in the aggregate. While still dwarfed by 
traditional capital markets, it is increasingly clear that ICOs are becoming a 
popular way for entrepreneurs to raise funds.37  
ICOs do not exactly fit in to the highly-regulated framework of traditional 
capital markets. There, fund raising efforts start with a business entity, with 
the fiduciary duties that come with the law under which the entity is 
organized. Burdensome disclosure requirements must be met to inform 
potential investors of the nature of the business and the risks associated with 
the investment. The exchange market themselves are heavily regulated to 
prevent fraud and other abuses. 
But in the ICO context there is no need for an entity to exist. There only 
needs to be software. An ICO promoter can issue as many tokens as she 
wants, and is only limited by the terms of the software she herself wrote (and, 
of course, by the demand for her tokens).38 The “pitch” to investors is not 
done via traditional prospectus—the standards of which are heavily regulated 
by securities laws—but on a “white paper.” The white paper is a document 
“that describe promoters’ plans for development and solicit community 
involvement.”39  The legal status of such white papers is unclear, and there 
are no market standards from what should be included in them.40 
At least initially, ICOs thus seem to have been operating in a regulatory 
vacuum. While such an environment may seem alarming to some, others 
view the lack of regulatory rigidity more sanguinely. “ICOs provide digital 
entrepreneurs with the opportunity to raise funding avoiding costs of 
compliance and intermediaries”,41 thus providing “unprecedented liquidity 
and efficiency for capital formation while minimizing transaction cost.”42  
With the rise of their popularity, various jurisdictions have started to 
consider regulatory frameworks to address them. But regulatory actions have 
been mostly reactive, rather than proactive. For example, in 2016, German 
promoters created a Decentralized Autonomous Organization (“DAO”) by 
selling virtual tokens in exchange for the cryptocurrency Ethereum (“ETH”). 
                                                 
36 ICO BENCH, ICO MARKET ANALYSIS 2018 (2018). 
37 Nathaniel Popper, Easiest Path to Riches on the Web? An Initial Coin Offering, N.Y.  
TIMES (June 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/23/business/dealbook/coin-
digital-currency.html (describing the rising popularity of ICOs). 
38 Cohsey et. al, supra note 29, at 21–23. 
39 Id. at 18. 
40 Id. 
41 WINIFRED HUANG, MICHELE MEOLI & SILVIO VISMARA, THE GEOGRAPHY OF INITIAL 
COIN OFFERINGS 3 (July 1, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3206234. 
42 Wulf Kaal, Initial Coin Offerings: The Top 25 Jurisdictions and their Comparative 
Regulatory Responses (as of May 2018), 1 STAN. J. OF BLOCKCHAIN L. AND POL’Y (2018), 
https://stanford-jblp.pubpub.org/pub/ico-comparative-reg. 
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The tokens promised holders the ability to vote on profit-seeking projects 
proposed to the DAO, and share in the profits generated, all through 
blockchain-based automated process.43 The DAO spectacularly failed after a 
hacker was able to divert about one-third of all DAO ETH investment to 
itself.44 The DAO saga attracted the attention of the United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC), which—in a lengthy document—ruled 
that DAO tokens are securities for U.S. securities regulation purposes.45 
Another reactive example is Shavers.46 There, the SEC prevailed in 
claiming that bitcoin is ”money” for securities fraud purposes.47  In addition, 
the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) is now regulating 
cryptocurrencies exchanges ad money transmitters, subjecting them to 
various “know your costumer rules”.48The IRS classified cryptocurrencies as 
“property” for tax purposes, which means that any disposition of a token is a 
taxable event.49 These regulatory responses were not a result of a well-
conceived policy of how to regulate blockchain, but are better described as 
putting out fires.   
Other countries had different experiences and have taken different 
regulatory approaches.50 Moreover, to date, there have only been sparse 
coordinated efforts at establishing international regulatory standards 
(discussed below).51  
At this point it is reasonable to conclude that the regulatory development 
of ICO regulation is nascent, and often confusing. Most countries simply 
seem to relay on existing laws and regulation, which are often not well 
adapted to the blockchain technology.52 In this regulatory environment 
“almost all ICOs rely on legislative loopholes or, more accurately, what the 
issuing entity hopes (or prays) is a loophole or grey area.”53  As explained in 
the Part III below, this created a perfect niche opportunity for tax haven 
jurisdictions.  
                                                 
43 Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934: The DAO, Exchange Act Release No. 81207 at 2–8 (July 25, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-81207.pdf. 
44 Id. at 9–10.  
45 Id. at 11–14. 
46 Sec. and Exch. Comm’n v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2013 WL 4028182 (E.D. 
Tex. Aug. 6, 2013). 
47 Id. at 2. 
48 U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS 
ADMINISTERING, EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES *3 (FinCEN Mar. 18, 
2013), http://fincen.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2013-G001.pdf. 
49 IRS Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938, 2014 WL 1224474 (Mar. 25, 2014). 
50 Kaal, supra note 42. 
51 See supra notes Error! Bookmark not defined.-151, and accompanying discussion. 
52 Zetzsche et. al., supra note 32, at 24. 
53 Id. at 11. 
Draft of Mar. 17, 2019
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3357168
10 Blockchain Havens  
III.  THE DEMISE OF THE TRADITIONAL TAX HAVEN MODEL  
Tax Havens did well for years by offering refuge from tax and regulatory 
requirements of developed jurisdictions. As explained in this part, this 
traditional model is no longer sustainable. The rise of blockchain technology, 
however, offers tax havens a unique alternative business model.  
A. The Traditional Tax Haven “Business Model” 
There is no clear definition of what constitutes a “tax haven.”54 Generally 
speaking, however, jurisdictions that are traditionally referred to as “tax 
havens” possess two key characteristics: very low (or no) taxes on foreign 
residents, and robust financial secrecy laws.55 Tax havens’ business model is 
essentially to sell access to these commodities in exchange for fees, such as 
incorporation fees.   
The key draw of tax havens is that they enable taxpayers to avoid taxes 
and regulation in other jurisdictions. Consider, for example, the crudest—yet 
very effective—form of tax evasion: unreported income. U.S. residents must 
pay tax on their worldwide income.56 If a U.S. taxpayer holds corporate bonds 
in a U.S. brokerage account, any interest received is reported to the IRS. The 
owner of the account will have a very hard time hiding her income from the 
IRS. 
What if instead, the taxpayer creates a shell entity in a tax haven, have the 
shell entity open a bank account in the tax haven in the entity’s name, and 
holds corporate bonds in that account. Under the tax haven laws, income 
accrued to the bank account is not taxed, and under the financial secrecy laws 
of that jurisdiction, the beneficial owner of the entity is not known. Even 
though the U.S. taxpayer must report the interest income and pay tax on it, 
she can simply choose not to report the income. This type of evasion is a 
crime,57 but one that the IRS can do little about. The IRS will never know 
about the unreported income. Whatever incorporation fees are paid by the 
entity to the tax haven are functionally the cost of tax evasion to the 
taxpayer.58 But this cost is dwarfed compared to the taxes that a taxpayer 
would have otherwise have to pay. This is a worthwhile exercise.    
There are less nefarious forms in which tax havens operate. These require 
more detailed explanation. Rather than support “evasion” as explained above, 
tax havens may be instrumental in tax “avoidance.” Such tax reduction 
strategies are often legal, but would not be possible without the assistance of 
a friendly tax haven jurisdiction. 
                                                 
54 For purposes of this essay, I use the tax havens jurisdiction list in James. R. Hines Jr., 
Do Tax Havens Flourish?, 19 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 65 (2005). 
55 Marian, Are Cryptocurrencies Super Tax Havens?, supra note 21. 
56 26 U.S.C § 1 (2018). 
57 Id. §§ 7201–07. 
58 Palan, supra note 9. 
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Consider, for example, debt/equity arbitrage.59 Say “Parent” is a 
corporation that is a tax-resident in country A, and that Parent wholly owns 
“Sub,” a tax resident and operating in country B. Most jurisdictions in country 
A’s position would not impose tax on dividends received by Parent from Sub, 
but will impose tax on interest received by Parent from Sub. On the other 
hand, most countries in B’s position would also allow the Sub to deduct 
interest payments to Parent, but would not allow a deduction for dividends 
from Sub to Parent. The result would be that—no matter how Parent choses 
to finance Sub—tax will be paid by the Parent-Sub group in either A or B.60 
If Parent chooses to finance Sub with equity, income tax will be paid in 
B. Sub will pay corporate tax on its income in B, and will receive no 
deduction for dividend payment to Parent. A, on the other hand, will not 
impose tax on the dividend received by Parent. If Parent elects to finance Sub 
with debt, income tax is paid in A. Sub’s interest payment to Parent are 
deductible in B, which eliminate much (if not all) of Sub’s income tax base 
in B. The interest receipts by Parent, however, are taxable in A. 
It would have been beneficial if Parent could have financed Sub with an 
instrument that is classified as “equity” under the laws of A, but as “debt” 
under the laws of B. Payment from Sub to A would be classified as interest 
by B, and therefore deductible to Sub. Receipts by Parent would be classified 
as dividends by A, thus nontaxable to Parent. In other words, income would 
be taxed neither in A, nor in B. Unfortunately for Parent and Sub, most 
countries classify financing instruments similarly, so this scheme is pretty 
much impossible. 
This is where tax haven jurisdictions can offer their services. Instead of 
financing Sub directly, Parent can create “Mid,” an intermediary entity 
between Parent and Sub. Mid in incorporated in H, a tax haven. Parent now 
finances Sub back-to-back through Mid. H is a friendly jurisdiction, and 
agrees to treat the financing instrument from Parent to Mid as debt, even 
though it is substantively structured as equity. The financing instrument from 
Mid to Sub is structured as debt and treated as such. 
Thus, payment from Sub to Mid are deductible in B. Receipts by Mid in 
H are theoretically interest income to Mid, but Mid need not worry. The 
payments from Mid to Parent are treated as interest payment in H, thus 
deductible to Mid. But because this instrument is, in substance, equity – 
                                                 
59 Omri Marian, The State Administration of International Tax Avoidance, 7 HARV. BUS. 
L. REV. 1, 26–29 (2017) (explaining debt-equity arbitrage).   
60 This principle in international taxation is known as and the expected outcome of the 
“Single Tax Principle,” under which “income from cross-border transactions should be 
subject to tax once (that is, neither more nor less than once).” REUVEN S. AVI-YONAH, 
INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TAX 
REGIME 8 (2007). 
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receipts by Parent are considered dividends in A, and as such not taxable in 
A. Thus, with the help of a friendly tax haven administrator, Parent and Sub 
were able to manufacture an arbitrage opportunity that did not exist 
otherwise. H performs no economic role in the business of the group, except 
for allowing the incorporation of Mid – a shell entity that facilitates tax 
avoidance. 
In exchange for the friendly treatment, H would probably ask that small 
taxable “spread” (say, 0.25%) on the back-to-back payment will remain with 
Mid to be taxed by H. This was in fact the exact business model employed 
by Luxembourg, and exposed in a leak by an employee of the accounting firm 
of PwC.61 This leak prompted global outrage and became known as the 
LuxLeaks scandal. 
B. The Battle Against Tax Havens 
For years, tax havens were able to successfully milk the business model 
described above to the extreme at the expense of other jurisdictions. 
However, these days are now coming to an end. An increased academic 
attention to inequality,62 popular outrage—driven largely by multiple leaks 
of tax haven documents63—on the role played by tax havens in inequality, 
and multiple intergovernmental initiatives, have initiated real changes. 
For example, since 2008, the OECD has been engaged in a project known 
as the Anti-BEPS (or simply BEPS) project. BEPS stands for “Base Erosion 
and Profits Shifting”.64 BEPS is probably the most expansive internationally 
coordinated effort aimed at preventing tax avoidance.65 It culminated in 
multiple recommendations aimed at preventing perceived tax abuses, some 
specifically aimed at preventing arbitrage schemes such as the one described 
above used by Luxembourg.66 
Even though the BEPS project recommendations are not binding, the 
BEPS project definitely changed the discourse about tax avoidance, with the 
result of several binding international instruments signed by multiple 
                                                 
61 Marian, The State Administration of International Tax Avoidance, supra note 59, at 
3.  
62 See, e,g., THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2017);  
GABRIEL ZUCMAN, THE HIDDEN WEALTH OF NATIONS: THE SCOURGE OF TAX HAVENS 
(2015). Both of the cited books explore the rise of inequality, including the role tax avoidance 
and evasion through tax havens play in context.  
63 For a discussion on how recent leaks affected legislative changes in multiple 
jurisdictions, see Shu-Yi Oei & Diane Ring, Leak Driven Law, 65 UCLA L. REV. 532 (2018). 
64  Base Erosion and Profits Shifting, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/ (last visited 
INSERT DATE). 
65 Marian, The State Administration of International Tax Avoidance, supra note 59, at 
21. 
66 OECD, NEUTRALISING THE EFFECTS OF HYBRID MISMATCH ARRANGEMENTS, ACTION 
2 - 2015 FINAL REPORT (2015).  
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countries. For example, one of BEPS most far-reaching results is the 
“Multilateral Instrument” (MLI), a binding instrument aimed at amending, 
all at once, thousands of bilateral tax agreements.67 Another example is a 
2010 amendment to the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in 
Tax Matters, which requires an expansive exchange of tax information 
between tax authorities regarding the activities of multinational 
corporations.68 The European Union has adopted an EU-wide directive that 
implements many of BEPS anti-avoidance recommendations,69 as well as a 
list of “uncooperative tax havens.”70 Multiple countries have also acted 
unilaterally to adopt the BEPS project outcomes. Even the 2017 tax reform 
in the United States,71 implemented—for the first time—measures aimed 
specifically at preventing arbitrage of the type describe above.72 As a result 
of such actions, tax havens are not as instrumental as they used to be in 
facilitating tax avoidance. Developed economies simply acted to change their 
own laws in order to deny the benefits associated with tax avoidance through 
tax havens.  
Similar anti tax haven trends have been prevalent on the context of tax 
evasion. In 2010, the United States Congress enacted the Foreign Tax 
Account Compliance Act (“FATCA”).73 Under FATCA, foreign financial 
institutions that operate in the United States must verify whether the 
beneficiaries of financial accounts are U.S. taxpayers. If U.S. taxpayers are 
identified, the institutions must report the accounts information to the IRS, or 
otherwise face a hefty tax on their U.S. income.74 Even though FATCA 
caused international outrage at first—accusing the United States of 
overstepping its jurisdiction—multiple other countries have copied the 
model,75 and the OECD specifically acted on the model. The OECD 
developed a framework (the CRS noted above)76 under which financial 
institutions share information with tax authorities, and tax authorities share 
                                                 
67 MULTILATERAL CONVENTION TO IMPLEMENT TAX TREATY RELATED MEASURES TO 
PREVENT BEPS (2016). 
68 MCAA, supra note 18. 
69 EUROPEAN COMM'N, TAXATION AND CUSTOMS UNION, supra note 19. 
70 Common EU List of Third Country Jurisdictions for Tax Purposes, EUROPEAN 
COMM’N (2018), https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/tax-common-eu-list_en#heading_1. 
71 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). 
72 See, e.g., §§ 26 U.S.C. 245A, 267A (new provisions denying certain benefits resulting 
from debt-equity arbitrage). 
73 Foreign Accounts Tax Compliance Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 1471–74 (2012). 
74 Id. 
75 Multiple countries have entered into agreements with the United States to share 
information under FTACA. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., FOREIGN ACCOUNT TAX 
COMPLIANCE ACT (FATCA), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/treaties/pages/fatca.aspx.  
76 OECD, supra note 17. 
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information with one another. Thus, taxpayers can no longer shield under 
banking secrecy laws to avoid detection. 
In the face of international pressure and public outrage, tax havens have 
even been forced to change their own laws and practices. For example, in 
2015 Ireland changed its law defining tax residence of corporations. This was 
a result of international pressure due to the fact that the former Irish definition 
was used by multinational corporations (“MNCs”) to avoid taxes in other 
places.77  In response to the exchange of information trend, Switzerland 
changed its bank secrecy laws to allow its tax authority to share information 
with other tax authorities.78 Luxembourg completely revamped its 
administrative tax rulings practices as a result of the LuxLeaks scandal 
described above.79 Multiple tiny tax jurisdictions, which for years owed their 
economic existence to the benefits of bank secrecy, now have agreements in 
place with the United States, under which they are required to share bank 
account information with the IRS.80  
The internationally coordinated effort of developed economies against 
tax havens and financial institutions in tax havens is bearing fruit.  The age 
of the traditional tax haven business model is coming to an end.   
IV.  THE RISE OF THE BLOCKCHAIN HAVEN  
A. Blockchain and Tax Haven Synergies  
In a 2013 essay, I laid out a case for the rise of cryptocurrencies as an 
alternative for tax havens.81 The argument was rather straight forward: 
cryptocurrencies offer similar advantages to tax evaders offered by tax 
havens: no taxation (since cryptocurrencies are decentralized, there is not 
central authority to impose tax), and high levels of anonymity (since user 
need not identify themselves). Moreover, cryptocurrencies are not as 
vulnerable as tax havens to the measures used by developed countries to 
battle tax havens. As explained above, anti tax haven measure target tax 
havens themselves, and financial institutions operating in tax havens. In other 
words, the measures are applied against intermediaries facilitating secrecy 
and arbitrage. Cryptocurrencies, in theory, do not need to rely on 
                                                 
77 Stephen Castle & Mark Scott, Ireland to Phase Out ‘Double Irish’ Tax Break Used 
by Tech Giants, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/15/business/international/ireland-to-phase-out-tax-
advantage-used-by-technology-firms.html. 
78 Michael Shields, Era of Bank Secrecy Ends as Swiss Start Sharing Account Data, 
REUTERS (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-swiss-secrecy/era-of-bank-
secrecy-ends-as-swiss-start-sharing-account-data-idUSKCN1MF13O. 
79 Patrick Mischo & Franz Kerger, After ‘Lux Leaks’: Welcome Changes to 
Luxembourg’s Tax Ruling Practice, 77 TAX NOTES INT'L 1197 (2015). 
80 U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., supra note 75. 
81 Marian, Are Cryptocurrencies Super Tax Havens, supra note 21. 
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intermediaries for their successful operation. They are, in their very core, P2P 
systems. 
This does not mean, however, that tax havens have no role to play in the 
blockchain economy. There are several reasons for which traditional tax 
haven qualities may have a strong synergistic relationship with blockchain-
based applications. First, even though blockchain applications do not 
‘require’ intermediaries to operate, intermediaries serve useful purposes in 
markets, and as such naturally emerge.82 For example, not all cryptocurrency 
users are tech savvy enough to enable them to efficiently store and exchange 
cryptocurrencies.83 It is easier for most users to use online exchanges or 
mobile apps to buy or sell cryptocurrencies. These exchanges may be a target 
for regulation and enforcement actions just like traditional financial 
intermediaries, and indeed they have been.  A recent striking example is the 
Coinbase John Doe summons.84 Coinbase is an online exchange that 
facilitates and clears transaction in cryptocurrencies. Suspecting that 
cryptocurrency users use Coinbase accounts to evade taxes, the IRS sought 
to force Coinbase, and eventually succeeded, to turn over information about 
account holder to the IRS.  
Traditional tax havens can offer refuge to such intermediaries. They can 
promise such blockchain intermediaries the ability to operate away from 
regulators in developed countries. Havens can offer an alternative in the form 
of unregulated or lightly regulated environment. 
Second, most new blockchain ventures must start with entrepreneurs. 
Someone has to come up with the idea and draft a business plan. Someone 
has to write the code. Even if the eventual application is truly decentralized, 
the original entrepreneurial process is not. Again, entrepreneurs may prefer a 
low-regulation, low-tax environment to start their venture in, and tax havens 
are very good at not regulating, and not imposing tax on such entrepreneurs. 
Finally, tax havens are particularly well-suited to serve specific type of 
entrepreneurial activities: those that require little or no physical 
infrastructure. Tax havens are usually tiny jurisdictions that offer no economy 
of scale opportunities. They have minor markets, and relatively small 
populations. This means that they cannot support heavy infrastructure 
industries. On the other hand, they require a lesser amount of tax revenue to 
support relatively small populations and infrastructures. Under the traditional 
model, tax havens would effectively support tax avoidance and evasion of 
taxpayers in developed jurisdictions, in exchange for a minimal cut of the 
                                                 
82 Marian, A Conceptual Framework for the Regulation of Cryptocurrencies, supra note 
22, at 67. 
83 Id. 
84 United States v. Coinbase, Inc., No. 17-CV-01431-JSC, 2017 WL 5890052 (N.D. Cal. 
Nov. 28, 2017). 
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avoided taxes. Thus, for example, tax havens supported tax avoidance simply 
by allowing taxpayer to “park” cash in tax haven based accounts. This 
requires very little infrastructure.   
Blockchain technology offers similar opportunities. Blockchain 
applications themselves are virtual, even if they facilitate real world transfers. 
They operate via “nodes” scattered worldwide. Except for maybe a few 
founding employees, a server or two, and a small space, there is no need for 
serious infrastructure. Tax havens can offer that, just as they offered that to 
financial institutions. 
An important exception to the minimal infrastructure requirements are 
“mining” facilities, which stand in the heart of the blockchain verification 
process.85 Miners are users who verify the transaction based on blockchain 
in a competitive process that requires computing power. The incentive to 
participate in the mining process is the in the form of fees, or newly issued 
cryptocurrencies to the miner.  Without miners, there is not blockchain. These 
may require real infrastructure, and as such are located frequently in high tax 
jurisdictions.86 Such facilities may become the target of tax and other forms 
of regulation. However, this course of regulation is not very promising. New 
blockchain ventures are already designing decentralized processes without 
the need for a heavy physical mining infrastructure.87   
To summarize the points made in this subpart, blockchain technology 
may—in theory—replace tax havens in offering a favorable regulatory 
environment. Traditionally, tax havens provided a lenient regulatory 
environment, which relied on central authority sanctioning such 
environment. Blockchain can establish its own regulatory rules, which seem 
to dispense of the need for a centrally-sanctioned lenient regulation. 
However, even blockchain entrepreneur benefit from operating in a tax haven 
                                                 
85 For an explanation of the mining process, see FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 39–
42. 
86 Most large mining facilities are located in developed countries with cold climate, as 
the significant processing power requires constant cooling. See, e.g., Rick Noack,  
Cryptocurrency Mining In Iceland Is Using So Much Energy, The Electricity May Run Out, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/02/13/cryptocurrency-
mining-in-iceland-is-using-so-much-energy-the-electricity-may-run-
out/?utm_term=.1999c2a02292; Jacques Marcoux, Cheap Electricity, Cold Weather Provide 
'Huge Marketing Opportunity' For Manitoba To Attract Bitcoin 'Miners', CBC NEWS (Dec. 
20, 2017), https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/manitoba-bitcoin-1.4457486. 
87 See, e.g., Tezos, which claims its mining processes is resources-efficient, low cost 
process. L.M. GOLDMAN, TEZOS: A SELF-AMENDING CRYPTO-LEDGER 8 (2014). (“Because 
the thing you must prove to mine is not destruction of existing resources but provision of 
existing resources, a proof-of-stake currency does not rely on destroying massive resources 
as it gains in popularity”). https://tezos.com/static/position_paper-
841a0a56b573afb28da16f6650152fb4.pdf 
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environment. As such, there is a room for tax havens to become “meta” tax 
havens. Jurisdictions can allow blockchain entrepreneurs to operate in a way 
that allows the blockchain applications to offer the traditional tax haven 
benefits.    
B. Tax Havens are becoming Cryptocurrency Havens 
Many traditional tax havens are indeed taking keen interest in blockchain 
technologies, and try to position themselves as leaders in the field. They do 
so by offering blockchain entrepreneurs the commodities previously offered 
to tax evaders and tax avoiders.  
For example, as early as 2014 Switzerland started exploring the 
regulatory environment surrounding cryptocurrencies.88 Identifying the 
economic potential of cryptocurrencies, the Swiss government in 2015 acted 
to reduce “regulatory barriers for Fintech firms, including providers of 
mobile payment systems, virtual currencies, and online peer-to-peer lending, 
. . . by amending the Banking Regulation.”89 Most specifically, Switzerland 
exempted certain fin-tech entities that raise funds from the public in an 
amount smaller than CHF 1 million, from the need to obtain banking license, 
and from regulation by the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority.90 
This enables ICO issuers to sell digital tokens without being subject to 
financial regulation generally applicable to capital raising from the public. 
Many ICO also use Swiss foundations as the ICO entity. Under Swiss law, 
foundations that receive “donations”, as opposed to “investments” are tax 
exempt. It seems that Swiss authorities have been very accepting to the 
argument that funds raised in ICOs are donations, rather than investments, an 
issue that stirred much controversy.91  
The Swiss model is a perfect example of “a meta tax haven”. It allows 
blockchain entrepreneurs to operate almost regulation free, and in many cases 
with little or no tax liability. It is not surprising that Switzerland became a 
leader in ICOs, and “one of the most popular sites for cryptocurrency and 
blockchain startups.”92 The Swiss canton of Zug is known as “Crypto 
Valley.”93  
                                                 
88 JENNY GESLEY, REGULATION OF CRYPTOCURRENCY: SWITZERLAND, LIBRARY OF 
CONGRESS (2018), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/cryptocurrency/switzerland.php. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Rhodri Davies, I see… Oh! ICOs Crypto Tokens, Swiss Foundations and 
Philanthropy, CHARITIES AID FOUNDATION (Nov. 2, 2017),  
https://www.cafonline.org/about-us/blog-home/giving-thought/the-future-of-doing-good/i-
see-oh-crypto-token-sales-swiss-foundations-and-philanthropy; Sami Ahmed, 
Cryptocurrency & Robots: How to Tax and Pay Tax on Them, 69 S. C. L. REV. 697, 714–15 
(2018). 
92 Ahmed, supra note 89, at 714. 
93 See CRYPTO VALLEY, https://cryptovalley.swiss/ (last visited INSERT DATE). 
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In Malta, the “government has actively encouraged the development of 
cryptocurrency…[aiming t]o provide the necessary legal certainty to allow 
[the cryptocurrency] industry to flourish.”94 In 2018, Malta adopted a 
complete regulatory framework for blockchain, “designed to make Malta one 
of the most desirable locations to set up shop in the blockchain space.”95 
Malta is so well regarded as a location of ICOs, that it has become known as 
“Blockchain Island.”96  
Gibraltar, another traditional tax haven, “has actively legislated to 
regulate the operation of cryptocurrencies within its jurisdiction.”97 It also 
has its own nickname in the blockchain world: “Crypto Harbor.”98 Gibraltar 
made explicit its light touch stance on blockchain regulations. In 2018, for 
example, a senior advisor to the Gibraltar Financial Services Commission 
stated” We don’t see a place for us as a regulator, or indeed Gibraltar as a 
jurisdiction that makes its own laws, for saying what ‘good’ looks like in 
token sales… rather let the marketplace of authorized sponsors come up with 
possibly a number of different options of what good looks like.”99  
Crypto Valley, Blockchain Island, and Crypto Harbor are hardly the only 
movers. Multiple other tiny jurisdictions—traditionally regarded to as tax 
havens—have taken regulatory approaches aimed to encourage the operation 
of blockchain startups. These include, for example, the Cayman Islands,100 
the Marshal Islands,101 Luxembourg,102 and Anguilla.103 
                                                 
94 GLOBAL L. RES. DIRECTORATE STAFF, REGULATION OF CRYPTOCURRENCY: MALTA, 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (2018),  https://www.loc.gov/law/help/cryptocurrency/world-
survey.php#malta. 
95 Rachel Wolfson, Maltese Parliament Passes Laws That Set Regulatory Framework 
for Blockchain, Cryptocurrency and DLT, FORBES (July 5, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rachelwolfson/2018/07/05/maltese-parliament-passes-laws-
that-set-regulatory-framework-for-blockchain-cryptocurrency-and-dlt/#678d5c0349ed. 
96 Talib Visram, Malta Wants to Become ‘Blockchain Island’, CNN (July 18, 2018), 
https://money.cnn.com/2018/07/18/technology/startups/malta-blockchain/index.html. 
97 CLARE FEIKERT-AHALT, REGULATION OF CRYPTOCURRENCY: GIBRALTAR, LIBRARY 
OF CONGRESS (2018), https://www.loc.gov/law/help/cryptocurrency/gibraltar.php. 
98 Oscar Williams-Grut, The Crypto-Friendly Gibraltar Stock Exchange Is Doing Its 
Own ICO, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.businessinsider.com/gibraltar-stock-
exchange-blockchain-ico-rock-token-2018-1.   
99 Annaliese Milano, Gibraltar Will Take Market-Driven Approach to ICO Rules, 
COINDESK (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/gibraltar-take-market-driven-
approach-ico-rules-officials-say. 
100 Silva, supra note 3. 
101  Declaration and Issuance of the Sovereign Currency Act Bill 2018, Nitijela Bill 
125ND2 pt. 3 (RMI). 
102 GLOBAL LEGAL RESEARCH DIRECTORATE STAFF, REGULATION OF 
CRYPTOCURRENCY: LUXEMBOURG, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (2018), 
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/cryptocurrency/world-survey.php#luxembourg. 
103 GLOBAL L. RES. DIRECTORATE STAFF, REGULATION OF CRYPTOCURRENCY: 
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Indeed, recent statistics on ICO clearly demonstrate the disproportionally 
large role played by tax havens in the ICO market. For example, a recent 
survey of geographical distribution of ICOs104 finds that that the top 25 
jurisdictions in the ICO world (both in terms of funds raised an in terms of 
number of ICOs), include known tax havens such as Switzerland, Singapore, 
Gibraltar, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, and Myanmar,105 far outpacing many 
developed high-tax economies.   Another Survey106 finds that, by number of 
ICOs, the 10 leading jurisdictions for ICOs include Singapore (#2), 
Switzerland (#4), Hong Kong (#5), and Gibraltar (#8), with a share of global 
ICOs that completely outweighs the proportional size of these jurisdictions 
in world economy. A third survey107 reports that Singapore, Switzerland, 
Hong Kong, Netherlands, and the British Territories, account—in the 
aggregate—for 36.7% of all global ICOs in 2017-2018 in nominal terms, 
again, far outweighing the size of these jurisdictions in the world economy. 
Tax havens, so it seems, are gradually transforming into Blockchain 
Havens.           
V.  THE DANGERS OF BLOCKCHAIN HAVENS 
As noted above, blockchain technology hold much promise, but also 
presents unique risks.108 This part explores the how the rise of cryptocurrency 
havens exacerbates the risks associated with blockchain-based applications. 
Subpart A explores the unique characteristics of blockchain technology and 
their synergies with tax havens’ regulatory environment. It explains how such 
synergies creates an enticing environment for illicit use.  Part B provides 
some initial data suggesting that Blockchain Havens are already being illicitly 
used by some blockchain entrepreneurs.     
A.  How Blockchain Havens Invite Illicit Blockchain Activity  
For purposes of this assessment I define Blockchain Havens as 
jurisdictions that offer blockchain entrepreneurs an opportunity to establish 
blockchain-ventures with little or no regularity oversight, and with minimal 
requirements of identification of owners, participants and beneficiaries of the 
venture. 
To understand the unique risks that the blockchain-haven jurisdiction 
synergy presents, it is helpful to note several important characteristics of 
blockchain technology. 
                                                 
ANGUILLA, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS (2018), 
https://www.loc.gov/law/help/cryptocurrency/world-survey.php#anguilla. 
104 Kaal, supra note 42. 
105 Id. 
106 Zetzsche et. al., supra note 32. 
107 HUANG, MEOLI & VISMARA, supra note 41, at 26. 
108 FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 45–46 (discussing the dual nature of blockchain, 
as a force of both good and evil).  
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The first, is disintermediation (or decentralization).109 No single party 
controls the technology, and the technology does not rely on a single party 
for operation and maintenance. This means that once a blockchain application 
is “released” on the internet, national borders and the regulations that come 
in with them become largely irrelevant. A governmental body cannot, for 
example, amend or improve a rouge software. The only way to change the 
operation of blockchain based software is with the agreement of majority of 
the users,110 of which there may be millions who are scattered across the 
globe. This suggests that the best opportunity for regulators to act as 
gatekeepers is before a blockchain-based venture starts its operation. 
Cryptocurrency havens, however, present themselves as a “lightly regulated” 
entry point to the global system, thus enabling blockchain entrepreneur to 
completely avoid regulation at the time at which regulation can be the most 
potent. Once the blockchain applications is operation, no single 
government—including the government of the jurisdiction where the 
application was developed—can undo it. 
The second important characteristic of the technology is resiliency and 
temper-resistance.111 “Once information has been recorded to a blockchain, 
it becomes exceptionally hard to change or delete.”112 Transactions cannot 
simply be canceled. This means that transaction errors, or worse – intentional 
misdeed such as fraud—are most likely irreversible once executed. This 
makes blockchain-based application particularly attractive as an instrument 
for illicit use. Once a fraudster is able to receive illicit gains using a 
blockchain-based application, the victim as no recourse. The is no insurance 
company, a financial intermediary, or another central body that can 
compensate the victim. The only recourse is to try and make the fraudster pay 
back the illicit gain. This again demonstrates the importance of regulating the 
technology before it becomes operational, and to make sure the code is 
written in a way that allows for potential remedies for victims of fraud. But 
Cryptocurrency Havens, again, present themselves specifically as the 
opposite. They will let the “market decide.” They intentionally avoid 
regulating the content of the software. 
The problems of irreversibility of blockchain transactions is significantly 
exacerbated because blockchain provides pseudonymity to it users.113 As 
explained, one need not identify self in order to become a blockchain user. 
“Pseudonimity … creates incentives for parties to engage in unlawful social 
                                                 
109 See id. at 34–35 
110 Generally speaking, blockchain code can only be changed if majority of the miners 
agree to the change (also known as “Hard Fork”). See id. at 187–89.  
111 See id. at 35–37 
112 Id. at 35. 
113 Id. at 38–39. 
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and economic activity.114     
Thus, if—as explained above— the only recourse of a victim against a 
blockchain-based fraudster is to recover directly from the fraudster, the fact 
that the fraudster can remain anonymous makes the recovery nearly 
impossible. Recent coordinated activities against tax havens significantly 
hampered tax havens ability to trade in secrecy.115 But now blockchain 
provides the secrecy so coveted by illicit actors. By allowing blockchain 
ventures to operate unregulated, Cryptocurrency Haven created a back door 
to allow—once again—the trade in secrecy. This problem is expected to 
become worse as new blockchain applications are specifically designed to 
increase users’ anonymity.116 This can be prevented only if the jurisdiction 
where venture start imposes some limits on anonymity before allowing 
blockchain applications to launch. This is not to be expected from 
jurisdictions whose entire business model is to benefit from anonymity.  
A final characteristic of blockchain technology that makes it particularly 
dangerous in the lenient regulatory environment offer by havens, is “the 
ability to facilitate the deployment of autonomous software that is not under 
the control of one party.”117 Blockchain enables the autonomous operation of 
smart contracts based on objective standards. Once a code is released using 
blockchain, there is no stopping it. Consider, for example, a blockchain-based 
contract under which million dollars are transferred to a specific account once 
a high-level political target is assassinated. Even if the person ordering the 
contract changes her mind, she cannot undo the agreement. The hitman still 
has the incentive, because the money will be transferred if the contract is 
executed. “Autonomous systems need not abide by existing rules and 
jurisdictional constraints; they can be designed to bypass or simply ignore the 
law of a particular jurisdiction. Once deployed on a blockchain, these systems 
will continue to operate . . ..”118 
This again introduces the problem of timing of regulation. Regulation 
aimed to prevent the damage done by malicious autonomous code can only 
be successful if applied to prevent the release of the code in the first place, or 
allow for its correction in a centralized manner. This requires a will to 
regulate from the jurisdiction where the blockchain venture operates. And the 
regulation itself will require high technical skills – the ability to read and 
thoroughly understand the code, in order to make sure it does not contain 
malicious autonomous functions. This is not only difficult; it is probably 
                                                 
114 Id. at 39. 
115 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
116 For a description of several projects aiming to increase the anonymity of blockchain 
users, see FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 6, at 44–45. 
117 Id. at 43. 
118 Id. at 44. 
Draft of Mar. 17, 2019
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3357168
22 Blockchain Havens  
beyond the regulatory capability of the tiny jurisdictions that function as 
Blockchain Havens. 
B.  The Illicit Use of Blockchain Havens        
1. Illicit Use in General 
The dangers described in Subpart above are not theoretical. There is 
plenty of anecdotal evidence that blockchain technology is used to facilitate 
illegal activity, and that the ICO industry is—to a significant extent—driven 
by illicit motives.119 
One of the most well-known examples in recent years is the Silk Road 
affair. Silk Road was an online black-market that facilitated illicit 
transactions such as sales of drugs, weapons, and fake identification. The 
currency used on the website was bitcoin—the first blockchain-based 
cryptocurrency—mostly for its anonymous properties.  The website was 
eventually shut down after an FBI investigation was able to identify Ross 
Ulbricht, a U.S. citizen and resident, as the operator of the website. Ulbricht 
was convicted of various criminal charges, and sentenced to life without 
parole.120 
There is also evidence suggesting that cryptocurrencies are used in tax 
evasion. In 2016 the I.R.S. sought a court order to force Coinbase—a U.S. 
based cryptocurrency exchange—to divulge information about Coinbase’s 
account holder to the IRS.121  The IRS justified it position by noting that in 
each of the years 2013, 2014 and 2015, only about 800 individuals reported 
gains from cryptocurrencies transactions to the IRS.122 Given the vast 
popularity of bitcoin in these years, the only logical conclusion was that most 
taxpayers who transact in cryptocurrencies simply do not report gains to the 
IRS. After a lengthy court battle, Coinbase agreed to reveal to the IRS 
information about 13,000 of its account holders, who have traded on 
Coinbase in values in excess of $20,000 between 2013 and 2015.123   
The downside of transaction irreversibility has been acutely demonstrated 
recently, when the founder of a Canadian cryptocurrency exchange 
QuadrigaCX passed away.124 As it turns out, he was the only person who 
knew the passwords to access offline cryptocurrency wallets, and now 
                                                 
119 For discussion of illicit use of blockchain, see Cohsey, supra note 29. 
120 Andy Greenberg, Silk Road Creator Ulbricht Losses Life Sentence Appeal, WIRED 
(May 31, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/05/silk-road-creator-ross-ulbricht-loses-life-
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121 United States v. Coinbase, Inc., No. 17-CV-01431-JSC, 2017 WL 5890052 (N.D. 
Cal. Nov. 28, 2017). 
122 Id. 
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124 Chris Morris, Cryptocurrency Owners Can't Access Funds After Exchange CEO 
Dies—Because No One Knows the Password, FORTUNE (Feb. 4, 2019), 
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costumers are unable to access $190 million worth of cryptocurrencies. Think 
of it as if the only key to your bank vault was held by a person who 
disappeared, except that you cannot physically pry open a cryptocurrency 
wallet. Some have suggested that the owner has faked his death as part of a 
sophisticated fraud scheme.125 
The fraudulent potential of unregulated ICO has also been acutely 
demonstrated in a recent paper, which explored whether ICO code actually 
delivers on promises made in the ICOs’ white papers.126 Cohesy et. al. find 
that “ICO code and ICO disclosures do not match.”127 For example, they find 
that almost all ICO white papers promise restrictions on token supply, but 
only about 2/3 of the ICOs that made such promise actually coded the promise 
into the ICO code.128 Another promise frequently made by ICO issuers, is 
that the issuers’ own holding will vest over time, to prevent a pump and dump 
schemes. The researchers have found that the majority of ICOs that promised 
vesting had no vesting coded into the program.129 In addition, Cohesy et. al. 
find that some ICO issuers had the ability to change the code, even though 
such fact was not disclosed in the white paper.  As Cohesy et. al aptly 
summarize their findings: “no one reads smart contracts.”130 Indeed, another 
recent study finds that as much as 80% of all ICOs in 2017 where fraudulent 
schemes.131  
Unlike regular securities offerings, investors ability to monitor issuers is 
heavily dependent on technical knowledge in coding, knowledge that most 
people simply do not have. This significantly enhances the case for a 
sophisticated state regulator to monitor ICOs. But cryptocurrency havens 
seem to be taking the exact opposite approach. 
2. Illicit Utilization of Blockchain Havens 
As explained above,132 Blockchain Havens seem to claim a disproportional 
level of blockchain activity, both in terms of absolute number of ICOs and in 
terms of fund raised by ICOs. Does that mean, however, that illicit use of 
ICOs can be associated with operating through Blockchain Havens? While a 
                                                 
125 Yogita Khatri & Stan Higgins, Government Death Certificate Says QuadrigaCX 
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full empirical analysis of this question is beyond the scope of this article, I 
argue that there is at least suggestive evidence that this is indeed the case. 
Since 2018, the Wall Street Journal had maintained a database of ICOs that  
present elements of fraudulent activity.133 I use this data set to try and assess 
how much of the suspected ICO activity can be associated with Blockchain 
Havens. 
Data. The WSJ database classifies an ICO as suspected if it presents at 
least one determinant of fraudulent activity. According to the WSJ 
methodology, such determinants include: (1) Duplicated language from an 
earlier white paper; (2) the ICO has been scrutinize by regulators; (3) The 
ICO team seems to be misrepresented or fake; (4) the ICO team is not 
disclosed at all in the white paper; (5) the ICO is described in terms of “can't 
miss” opportunity; or (6) the ICO website is unavailable.134 
Since 2018, the WSJ has reviewed over 3,300 ICOs, and has identified 
513 ICOs that “showed signs of plagiarism, identity theft and promises of 
improbable returns.”135 I examine these suspected ICOs in this Subpart, to 
determine whether they can be associated with blockchain havens. 
Methodology. To associate a particular ICO with a specific country of 
origin, I research ICO Bench—an ICO rating and listing website—for 
information about the ICO.136 If an ICO is not listed on ICO Bench, or no 
country information provided, then the following steps are taken: First, I 
check the ICO website link from Wall Street Journal to try and locate address 
information. If no information is found, other ICO reporting websites are 
consulted.137 If no country information is found, I use other online tools138 to 
assess whether the ICO is listed under the proper name. I also search Twitter, 
LinkedIn and Facebook pages purported to belong to the ICO issuers, to try 
and identify a geographical location information. 
In some cases, the process described above results in different 
geographical information reported by different sources. In such cases the ICO 
Bench location was selected, unless multiple other sources of information 
suggested a different geographical location. I was unable to determine the 
geographical origin of 62 ICOs. These ICOs are therefore excluded, resulting 
in a dataset of 451 ICOs. 
I then code each ICO as a “haven” ICO or “non-haven” ICO based on the 
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geographical location. I use two alternative tests to determine whether the 
ICO jurisdiction is a “haven”.  
Under one alternative, I use the list of tax havens jurisdictions identified 
by Hines and Rice.139 This list has consistently been used by academics in 
tax havens research, and is considered authoritative. The problem with the 
Hines-Rice list is that it relies on tax havens classification by others, and that 
it is old. I therefore use a more modern alternative – the Tax Justice Network 
Financial Secrecy Index (“FSI”).140 The FSI “ranks jurisdictions according 
to their secrecy and the scale of their offshore financial activities.” I denote a 
haven any jurisdiction with a financial secrecy score of 70% or above. 
Jurisdictions that are found just around the threshold include, for example, 
Hong-Kong (71.05), Gibraltar (70.83), Mauritius (72.35) and the Cayman 
Islands (72.28) – all traditionally viewed as tax havens.   
Descriptive statistics. Descriptive statistics suggests that a significant 
portion of the suspected ICOs are associated with a haven jurisdiction. Using 
the Hines-Rice list as are haven jurisdiction indicator, 108 suspected ICOs—
23.85% of the total—are haven based. Using the FSI to determine the status 
of the jurisdiction, 145 suspected ICOs—32.18% of the total—are haven-
based.  
This results suggest that a significant number of suspected ICOs—
between 23.85% and 32.18%—are executed through Blockchain Havens. 
Moreover, a recent ICO Bench report suggest that in absolute numbers, only 
about 13% of all ICOs are executed through tax havens. 141  It thus seems that 
haven based ICOs are more likely to be suspect than non-haven ICOs. 
The chart below summarizes the countries that lead the issuances of 
suspected ICOs. The gray data points represent jurisdictions listed as tax 
havens by Hines & Rice. 
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Caveats. This exploratory data is obviously just that – exploratory. It 
should not be construed as a full blown statistical analysis suggesting that 
suspected ICOs are more likely to be operated through haven jurisdiction. 
Such an analysis would be beyond the scope of the article. It should also be 
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noted that in some instances, I found discrepancies with the WSJ dataset. For 
example, some ICOs who were classified has having no website by the WSJ, 
seem to have had a perfectly functioning website.  
However, that data presented is—at the minimum—suggestive that 
Blockchain Haven jurisdictions attract suspected blockchain activity to a 
significant extent.    
VI.  WHAT SHOULD THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY DO ABOUT 
CRYPTO-HAVENS? 
C.  Current Responses by the International Community  
When confronted with unacceptable tax haven practices, developed 
jurisdiction acted in a coordinated manner against the tax havens themselves, 
or against the financial institutions operating in tax havens. Coordination is 
necessary in such context, because a few bad jurisdictions can topple the 
entire effort. After all, criminals do not need many places to hide their illicit 
gain. One or few safe havens can do the trick. There is a need for all 
jurisdictions to cooperate to prevent a race to the bottom.    
Such a coordinated approach is much more challenging in the 
cryptocurrency haven context, given the unique decentralized, semi-
anonymous nature of the technology. This is demonstrated by the apparent 
difficulty of the international community to engage this issue meaningfully. 
Even though some in the intergovernmental community have already 
identified the need for a coordinated effort, there has been little progress in 
this area. In December 2018 the OECD submitted a report to the G20 meeting 
in Buenos Aires, Argentina.142 The report states that the OECD is still in the 
preliminary stages of “analysing the risks and possible responses” to “crypto-
assets,” with an updated report scheduled for 2019 and a finalized report by 
2020.143 The OECD’s research is part of a larger project looking into the tax 
challenges arising from digitalization.144 It is clear from the report that “no 
consensus was reached on the broader tax challenges associated with 
digitalization.”145 
The G20, in turn, stated in its joint declaration that countries need to 
“regulate crypto-assets for anti-money laundering and countering the 
financing of terrorism in line with FATF [Financial Action Task Force] 
standards.”146 FATF has yet to issue any specific standards governing 
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cryptocurrencies outside applying general anti money laundering 
requirements.147 Even FATF’s own report acknowledges that its 
recommendations are confusing to governments and the private sector.148 As 
for the case of taxation, the joint declaration simply echoes the OECD, stating 
that countries “will continue to work together to seek a consensus-based 
solution to address the impacts of the digitalization of the economy on the 
international tax system with an update in 2019 and a final report by 2020.”149  
Similarly, other inter-governmental bodies have made little progress in 
formulating international policy to govern cryptocurrencies. The 
International Organization of Securities Commissions held a meeting in 2017 
to “discuss the growing usage of ICOs to raise capital as an area of 
concern.”150 The result of this meeting was a bulletin board displaying each 
country’s individual ICO regulations, and an “ICO Consultation Network 
through which members can discuss their experiences and bring their 
concerns, including cross-border issues, to the attention of fellow 
regulators.”151  
The U.S. recently joined the Joint Chiefs of Global Tax Enforcement (the 
“J5”) – a five-member partnership between the Australian Criminal 
Intelligence Commission and Australian Taxation Office, the Canada 
Revenue Agency, the Fiscale Inlichtingen- en Opsporingsdienst in the 
Netherlands, the U.K.’s HM Revenue & Customs and the U.S. Internal 
Revenue Service criminal investigation division.152 The J5’s mission 
statement explicitly lists “cryptocurrencies and cybercrime” as targets for 
enforcement. Specifically, the J5 aims to coordinate efforts “to track down 
those people who make a living out of facilitating and enabling international 
tax crime.”153 However, there has been no mention of formulating any sort of 
coordinated regulatory policy governing cryptocurrency taxation. 
In summary, current global efforts to address the challenges presented by 
blockchain technology are sporadic, confused, and seem to be at a primordial 
stage. In the next part, I explore three potential avenues for a coordinated 
international regulatory approach: The laissez-faire approaches, the reactive 
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approach, and the proactive approach. 
D.  Potential Approaches for the International Regulation of Blockchain 
Havens 
1. Let the Market Work 
The very birth of the blockchain technology is in libertarian principles. 
One might argue it is sensible to let the market run its course. Unsuccessful 
blockchain technologies will disappear, and good ones will prevail. 
While sensible to a certain extent, such an approach fails to capture the 
danger in the irreversibility for blockchain transactions. Fraudulent gains are 
likely to never be returned. There is no single entity to recover from, nor there 
is an issuer can be identified. The market has no ability “to correct” for a one-
off fraudulent events. 
One market based solution that may contribute is to create of blockchain 
expert intermediaries who will evaluate the quality of the blockchain code, 
compare it with white paper promises, and grade the ICO quality. Rating 
agencies for blockchain ICOs, if you will. 
While this is desirable, such solution may fall short for the same reasons 
that credit rating agencies sometime fail. In addition, unlike in the case of 
credit rating agencies, correction of rating in retrospect is likely to be 
meaningless due to the finality of transaction. In addition, rating agencies 
may only be useful for rating ICOs or other public crowd-based applications. 
Blockchain can be used privately for illicit purposes (such as drug trafficking, 
and tax evasion). In such a context, code-quality regulation is meaningless. 
2. The Reactive Approach                   
For the same reasons for which a free market approach falls short, so does 
a reactive regulatory approach. As explained above, once blockchain-based 
software has entered the global web environment, it is very difficult to undo.  
A reactive approach may result in an excessive regulatory response. If a 
malicious software is “released to the wild” and is automatically designed to 
operate in a way that a government may deem disruptive, no government can 
just “shut down”, or amend the code. The only way to stop the malicious code 
from operating within the jurisdiction is to physically prevent its operation. 
For example, if it is known that a blockchain program is designed to shut 
down the power grid on a specific date, it is not possible to stop it by changing 
the program. One would have to prevent the program from using the internet 
to execute its operation. Either you take the grid off the internet, or you 
identify the physical source of the program (such as a specific server), and 
disallow internet traffic into the jurisdiction from the sever. This, however, 
may not be possible given that it is likely that the blockchain code operates 
through multiple online nodes. 
Moreover, such heavy-handed regulatory approach may hinder the 
positive aspects of blockchain based applications. For example, in the 
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extremes, a jurisdiction may seek to completely blocking any internet traffic 
associated with decentralized ledgers in order to stop undesired operations. 
Several regimes in countries with authoritarian tendencies have already taken 
similar approaches.154    
Finally, these shortcomings do not mean the ex-ante regulation should be 
abandoned altogether. There is still room to try and punish criminals, or 
recover from their illicit gains. But this must be supplanted by preventative 
medicine, as explained below. 
3. The Proactive Approach       
Given the unique nature of blockchain technology, it seems prudent to 
take an ex-ante approach, namely, to regulate blockchain application before 
they are released. Only at that point in time there are still intermediaries 
susceptible to regulation: The entrepreneurs, and the jurisdictions in which 
they operate. 
But in order for such regulation to be successful, an intentionally 
coordinated approach must be taken. As in the case of tax havens, any one 
jurisdiction that breaks ranks can serve as an entry-point of unregulated 
blockchain software to the World Wide Web, in which case damage control 
efforts may prove futile. 
But what might such a coordinated approach include? A compressive plan 
for international regulation of blockchain based applications is well beyond 
this article, but some key points are discussed below, while considering the 
problematic characteristics of blockchain.        
For example, the problem of inability to regulate decentralized networks 
is addressed by the very meta-framework offered here: ex-ante regulation. 
This means regulating the issuers of ICOs, the programmers and the venture 
capitalist financing such ventures at the early stages of the project. In any 
case, before the application is turned on. 
The problem of pseudonymity can be addressed by subjected jurisdictions 
or financial institutions that host blockchain ventures, to certain “know your 
costumer rules”. Such rules must enable the jurisdictions in which blockchain 
ventures operate to identify the individuals involved with the venture, and to 
report their identities to interested authorities in other jurisdictions. 
The problem of irreversibility of transactions is partly remedied by 
disclosure and identification rules, as it may enable victims of fraud to 
identify the wrongdoers. A better way to address such issues is to require 
blockchain ventures to underwrite the risk of their venture. This can be 
achieved by insurance requirements, or by writing some sort of an escrow 
into the code. Such escrow would be automatically activated to compensate 
victims under certain circumstances. 
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In the case of ICOs, it is prudent to come up with a standard disclosure 
requirement, and a requirement for a regulator to compare the disclosure with 
the actual code. 
What the best forum is for such a coordination remains to be seen. In the 
global battle against tax havens, the best was, for the most part, the OECD. 
The OECD has recently launched the blockchain policy forum, and this may 
be a proper venue to initiate such a project.155 But wherever it happens, it 
needs to happen sooner rather than later, before multiple malicious 
blockchain applications take hold. Any delay is likely to bring about the worst 
in blockchain, and prevent the best in it from ever materializing. 
 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
This paper explored the rise of Blockchain Havens—jurisdiction that 
attract blockchain entrepreneurs by offering refuge from tax and regulation. 
Many of these jurisdictions are traditional tax havens, whose business model 
has been severely affected by recent international efforts to battle offshore 
financing.  
It seems that these jurisdictions gravitate towards a new model, where the 
benefits of secrecy and lax regulation are offered to blockchain entrepreneurs, 
rather than to tax cheats. Since blockchain is a largely anonymous and self-
regulated network, blockchain can offer illicit users the traditional benefits of 
tax havens. Blockchain Havens are thus best described as meta-tax-havens. 
The unique characteristics of blockchain technology—in particular, 
decentralization, temper resistance—make it almost impossible to regulate 
after the fact. It is therefore an inviting environment for illicit users, as 
recourse is next to impossible. Regulation therefor must come first, before 
blockchain applications start to operate. 
Since any one Blockchain Haven can independently offer unregulated 
entry-point for malicious blockchain applications, there is a need for a 
coordinated international effort to prevent a regulatory race to the bottom.  
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